Changes in the EU in response to new threats

Important EU decisions

On September 16, the European Parliament approved new measures to strengthen the Union’s defence readiness. The newly adopted changes under “Omnibus V” aim to accelerate investment in the European defence sector and simplify procedures related to implementing defence projects. These measures are part of the Readiness 2030 plan, whose goal is to increase European defence readiness by 2030. Under this plan, up to €800 billion could be mobilised to support defence over the next four years. The key provisions include: faster issuance of permits for defence projects, easier public procurement and equipment transfers, and improvements to the European Defence Fund. The legislative acts were adopted by Parliament with a broad majority.

On the same day, during her State of the European Union address, Ursula von der Leyen not only offered Canada the possibility of obtaining associate member status but also addressed the issue of strengthening the EU’s defence competences. The President of the European Commission spoke about the hybrid threats facing Europe, including cyberattacks, sabotage, and drone incursions into EU territory. A breakthrough announcement was a new mechanism serving as the EU’s equivalent of NATO’s Article 4, through which member states could initiate political consultations to coordinate an EU response in the event of a hybrid attack. Von der Leyen also proposed creating a “European Security Council”, which, beyond the leaders of EU member states, would also bring together countries such as Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada. At the end of her speech, she announced a new European Instrument for Strategic Enablers, which is intended to remain fully compatible with NATO and cover, among other things, capabilities in air and missile defence, strategic transport, aerial refuelling, space, and cybersecurity.

However, the Commission President’s speech leaves many open questions about how the announced changes to the EU’s defence strategy are supposed to come into effect. Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius described von der Leyen’s address as visionary and important for achieving “institutional defence readiness”. Some experts remain sceptical, however, wondering whether concrete action will follow the lofty announcements. The Union already has a number of instruments in the field of security and defence, such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund. The challenge, then, is not simply creating further mechanisms, but effectively using those that already exist, ensuring proper coordination, and adapting them to contemporary threats, including hybrid threats.

Are we dealing with permanent changes in the EU?

Do the events of September 16 represent a decisive turning point in the EU’s trajectory — from an institution classically described as a soft power or smart power toward aspirations closer to hard power? Or is this yet another example of elaborate rhetoric that does not, in fact, bring more drastic change? On the question of defence, the division of competences between EU institutions and member states also matters a great deal. Under EU treaty law, national security remains the exclusive responsibility of individual states, while the EU holds competences in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The European Union has no armed forces of its own, so it can strengthen its defence activities only through other tools, such as financial instruments. One example is the SAFE programme, which offers long-term loans for defence investments.

At the same time, the EU is also mindful of its position on the international stage. Canada as an ally represents not only a valuable economic partnership, but also the prospect of building a security bloc extending beyond Europe — especially given that Canada has, since June 2026, already been participating in procurements carried out under the SAFE programme as the first non-European state to do so. From a broader perspective, one might wonder whether partnerships of this kind will in the future serve as an alternative for the EU to its currently less stable cooperation with the United States.

According to the European Court of Auditors, the ambitious plan to achieve strategic autonomy and the ability to independently sustain high-intensity military operations by 2030 may not be realised on schedule. Despite an almost 80% increase in defence spending between 2020 and 2025, there are still shortfalls and delays in the defence industry’s production capacity, insufficient coordination of joint equipment procurement among EU states, and persistent gaps in operational capabilities. The Union also remains dependent on the United States for strategic and technological support. The ECA recommends that the EU improve production processes in the defence industry, strengthen cooperation on joint procurement, and make more effective use of EU financial instruments.

Despite developing the Common Security and Defence Policy, the EU has no army of its own and depends on the military capabilities of its member states. The current state of affairs does not suggest that the Union is about to become a classically understood hard power any time soon. In response to the growing threat from Russia, the EU is turning to instruments traditionally associated with both soft power and hard power. The EU has many financial and regulatory tools, and it is precisely through their use that it can shape the defence capabilities of member states. In my view, strengthening the EU’s competences is especially important not only in the purely military domain, but above all in the face of hybrid threats, which also require civilian and economic tools. The Union does not aspire to transform itself into a new NATO, but through developing elements of hard power and maintaining constant cooperation with the Alliance, it is increasing its capacity to act and to take responsibility for its own security.