Europe's Counter-Drone Strategy: Ambition meets implementation reality

For the first time, Brussels has sought to bring together a united response to the threat of drones across the entire range of civilian and military domains. The question of course remains whether this is evidence of real progress or simply another lengthy policy document waiting to be implemented selectively.

The Urgency Behind the Plan

The context in which this action plan is being implemented cannot be overstated. In the past few months, unmanned aircraft systems have gone from being esoteric to being used as tools of hybrid warfare. Russian overflights of the EU airspace have become the norm in some areas. Drones have been causing disruptions in the energy infrastructure of Eastern Europe, hitting wind farms, power stations, and district heating infrastructure with ever-increasing accuracy. Most disturbingly, hundreds of meteorological balloons with SIM cards have been launched across the borders of the EU to be used as tools of smuggling and what can only be described as probing activities against European defenses.

The economics are just as daunting. The business model of commercial airborne drones will reach a potential figure of €14.5 billion by 2030, which could reach up to €50 billion in 2033. However, the security risk posed by this very same system poses a threat to critical infrastructure worth many times more than the potential economic benefit the industry will provide. The disparity between the cost of the commercial drones, which are in the hundreds of euros, and the cost to neutralize them, which is in the thousands, is enormous. Protecting critical infrastructure against a coordinated attack extends this disparity exponentially.

The European Council and Parliament have taken steps to call action in the latter half of 2025 and the beginning of 2026. What the Commission has done, while thorough, illustrates the inherent problem that the European Union faces in attempting to bring coordinated action to the European stage.

A Framework Built on Four Pillars

The action plan structures its response around four operational domains: preparation, detection, response, and defense readiness. Each pillar addresses distinct but interconnected aspects of the problem.

The preparation phase focuses on technological development and industrial production. The Commission correctly identifies that Europe cannot afford to lag behind in counter-drone systems development. It proposes a civil-military industrial mapping exercise to identify capability gaps and prioritize investment. The establishment of regulatory sandboxes for testing innovative solutions is sensible, as is the upgrade of the Joint Research Centre’s counter-drone Living Lab into a full center of excellence. The Commission also plans to leverage funding through Horizon Europe, the European Defence Fund, and forthcoming instruments like the Industrial Accelerator Act.

However, the preparation pillar exposes a fundamental tension in European defense policy. Supporting a vibrant startup ecosystem in counter-drone technologies sounds compelling in press releases. European companies, however, face structural disadvantages that no amount of forum convening will resolve. The Chinese drone industry reached the pinnacle of global market share through economies of scale and government support, which European capitals have traditionally been loath to provide. Startups in Europe operating in this sector face the challenge of divergent national rules, a procurement process that moves at a glacial pace, and the problem that no EU member state provides a market sufficiently large to justify rapid scaling. The D-TECT Forum, a new industry platform proposed by the Commission, may help to bring officials together who share good intentions. However, forums do not build drones, secure production capacity, or solve the capital intensity problem of manufacturing defense technology.

The detection pillar represents perhaps the most innovative aspect of the plan. The Commission proposes leveraging 5G networks to enhance drone detection through two distinct mechanisms. The first involves tracking connected drones by identifying anomalous SIM card activity and unusual transmission patterns. This approach has clear merit: most commercial drones require connectivity to operate effectively, and telecom operators already possess the infrastructure to detect and disrupt such connections.

More ambitious in scope is the suggestion to use Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC) technology, which entails using 5G antennas to create a type of radar. Such a system has the potential to offer extensive coverage, which will allow both law enforcement and military officials to be aware of any unknown aerial objects. It has been tested in the European telecom industry, which is good to know. What is unfortunate to see, however, is the Commission’s level of assurance that it will be able to bring all the relevant spectrum regulators, telecom providers, and technical experts together in terms of regulations, new infrastructure roll-out, and technical specifications all within the year 2026. It is good to be optimistic about the EU’s ability to govern; it is less common to be realistic.

The plan further proposes the creation of an EU drones incident platform to gather information from all member states and create a common operational picture of the situation. This is a conceptually good idea, provided the member states actually share information in an honest and thorough fashion. But there are several reasons to believe this is unlikely. The effectiveness of this platform will ultimately depend on whether or not it is an honest information-sharing platform or whether it is just another EU database where countries enter carefully constructed and maximally defensible reports that protect national ego and satisfy Brussels« desire for documentation.

The response pillar acknowledges that effective counter-drone operations require coordination between civilian authorities, law enforcement, and military forces. The Commission proposes establishing Rapid Counter-drone Emergency Response Teams that can be rapidly deployed to member states facing threats beyond their national capacity. It also envisions strengthened integration of counter-drone capabilities into border management systems, with Frontex playing a more active role in drone and counter-drone operations across the EU’s external boundaries.

Critical infrastructure protection is a special area of concern in this regard, and the plan has outlined stress testing of its resilience against intrusion by drones based on models previously tested for submarine cables. The maritime domain is another area where there is a heightened focus in the plan, considering the vulnerability of subsea cables and platforms, as well as port facilities, to both surface and underwater drones. The concept of Regional Cable Hubs is to be extended to include Maritime Domain Awareness.

Yet the response pillar contains an unresolved tension regarding kinetic solutions. The plan references „hard kinetic solutions, including individual or in-swarm strike drones, gunnery and short-range missiles” with the nonchalance of someone describing shooting at drones from the safety of a Brussels office. But it provides no concrete legislative proposal for harmonizing rules of engagement or clarifying the legal authority of national and local authorities to neutralize threatening drones. While some member states have strict regulations, which, in effect, make it impossible to conduct counter-drone operations within populated areas, others enjoy a degree of flexibility. These regulatory inconsistencies, therefore, are set to make it difficult to implement the rapid response teams across member states, since what is legal in one country is a criminal offense in another, and that is not a trivial matter, especially if armed personnel are involved.

The defense readiness pillar links drones and counter-drones with the broader Defence Readiness 2030 Roadmap. This pillar focuses on the integration with air and missile defense systems, artillery systems, electronic warfare systems, and artificial intelligence systems. The European Defence Agency will be the coordinating body for capability development through its Priority Capability Areas. There will be continued investment through the European Defence Industry Programme, with a commitment to supporting start-ups through programs like BraveTechEU, which is based on battle experience from Ukraine.

The financial commitments are substantial: €1 billion from the European Defence Fund has already been allocated to drone-related research and development, with an additional €200 million planned over the next two years. Member states are expected to deploy significant additional resources through the SAFE Instrument for procurement of actual systems. Yet even with these resources, the EU faces a fundamental challenge: converting resources into deployed capabilities on timeframes relevant to immediate security threats.

The Ukraine Question

Throughout the plan runs a thread of explicit reliance on Ukrainian expertise and experience. The Commission proposes establishing a Drone Alliance with Ukraine to facilitate technology transfer, industrial cooperation, and supply chain integration. This represents a realistic acknowledgment that Ukraine has become the world’s leading innovator in combat drone applications and that European companies have much to learn from Ukrainian battlefield experience.

However, this reliance on Ukrainian innovation also reflects a constraint on European capabilities development. European defense procurement cycles typically span years. Ukraine’s innovation cycles operate at months or weeks. Formalizing this relationship through a Drone Alliance is sensible but raises questions about intellectual property rights, export controls, and the sustainability of joint ventures between Ukrainian companies operating under wartime conditions and European partners with regulatory certainties.

Implementation Challenges and Organizational Friction

The action plan clearly states that the success of its implementation relies on the establishment of a „strategic mechanism to coordinate the implementation” through the nomination of National Drone Security Coordinators by each member state. This is a necessary measure but does not constitute any innovation in the EU’s approach, as the EU has established similar coordination mechanisms in the past, and the results have been, shall we say, mixed. The success of this measure will rest solely in the hands of the member states, as to whether they consider the position to be one of real influence or simply a token gesture that the EU likes to receive formal acknowledgment of its initiatives.

The time frame outlined in the plan, which will see deliverables from as early as Q2 2026 up until 2027, represents political expediency in terms of delivering rapid results. Realistic capability development takes longer. Counter-drone systems will have to interface with existing air defense systems, which will differ significantly across member states. The push for standardization will face resistance from states whose indigenous industries have invested in non-standard systems. The suggestion to create harmonized testing methodologies and performance requirements for counter-drone systems is a reasonable one. It will inevitably lead to a debate over whose standards are adopted.

Information sharing presents another implementation challenge that the plan understates. The proposed EU drone incident platform depends on transparent reporting by member states about security incidents. Yet such transparency creates political risks. A significant drone intrusion or successful attack against critical infrastructure becomes public record. The member states with poor defenses will suffer from reputational damage. The member states with sophisticated defenses may be reluctant to reveal their capabilities and limitations. The success of the platform will depend on the data protection arrangements and the agreement on the handling of sensitive information, details of which are conspicuously lacking in the action plan.

The Balloon Problem: A Hidden Crisis

One of the most striking aspects of the plan is in how it deals with what seems to be a rising and underappreciated threat: the use of large meteorological balloons as unmanned aerial vehicles. With SIM cards for position tracking post-landing, they can be used for smuggling operations, but they can also be used to test European air defenses. The size, weight, altitude, and payload-carrying ability of these balloons provide a unique set of technical challenges for detection, which are different from those posed by drones. The response to this, as outlined in the plan, is a working group and a hackathon for solutions, which seems remarkably measured for a strategic threat that is treated as pressing. If these balloons are indeed being used as a form of hybrid warfare that is worthy of serious concern, then perhaps there is a need for a response greater than a series of innovation competitions and expert meetings.

This issue with balloons also points to a broader phenomenon: the EU often focuses on the administrative and technological aspects in addressing security concerns but fails to consider the operational and diplomatic aspects. A long-term balloon offensive against the EU territory is a topic for discussion in other areas, such as intelligence sharing and retaliation, but it is treated in the action plan as a matter to be addressed from a technical point of view, encouraging innovation.

Assessing Realistic Implementation Prospects

Assessing this action plan means separating those elements that are likely to succeed from those that are likely to be hindered by structural barriers. The technology-based initiatives, such as the development of new anti-drone technologies, improvement of detection infrastructure, and establishment of testing facilities, are likely to move forward. The funding structures in the EU function satisfactorily for R&D. The Commission has real expertise in administering big technology projects.

Information sharing and coordination mechanisms face steeper obstacles. Member states have demonstrated willingness to cooperate on security matters when they perceive direct national benefit, but cooperation on shared infrastructure protection often requires countries to acknowledge vulnerabilities. The proposed EU drone incident platform may become useful for post-incident analysis but is unlikely to function as a real-time operational coordination mechanism. National security establishments will continue to guard sensitive information about their own capabilities and vulnerabilities.

Regulatory harmonization will be a gradual process. The idea of extending the scope of registration and identification requirements to drones above 100 grams is sensible and will likely be adopted. The process of developing common performance requirements for C-drones is more complex and depends on achieving harmonization across countries with different risk assessments and technological preferences. The concept of the EU Trusted Drone Label appears to be utopian. The development of meaningful certification criteria without replicating existing cybersecurity requirements, such as the Cyber Resilience Act entering fully into force in December 2027, will require significant technical work.

The most important implementation challenge relates to civil-military integration. While the plan highlights civil-military synergies in several places, the reality is that European nations have unique command structures, classification systems for information, and operational systems between civilian and military operations. This calls for more than just policy guidance from Brussels; it demands institutional transformation at the nation-state level. While some nations may fully support civil-military integration, others will maintain a state of separation based on operational security needs and the concept of civilian control over the military. This will inevitably lead to fragmentation in counter-drone capabilities in the EU.

Financial Reality Check

The Commission’s financial commitments are significant but finite. The €1 billion already deployed for drone-related R&D has produced valuable capabilities but also highlights the reality that serious defense capability development is expensive. The additional €200 million planned for the European Defence Fund over the next two years amounts to roughly €100 million annually for an entire continent. For context, a single modern air defense system costs hundreds of millions. Scaling counter-drone production capacity to truly address the identified threat levels will require member state investment on scales that only the largest European economies can manage independently.

The promise of the upcoming Industrial Accelerator Act and the European Competitiveness Fund is promising, but both are untested. The EU has a poor history of launching successful defense industrial initiatives. From ambitious procurement consortiums that break down along national lines to collaborative projects plagued by cost overruns, there has been a sense of déjà vu in the past.

The Missing Strategic Element

Between the lines of this action plan, there is a strategic truth that is not explicitly stated: the EU is reacting to the threat of drones more in the context of critical infrastructure protection and border security than in the context of integrating with overall NATO air defense strategies. This is, of course, a sensible approach in that defense is still a national responsibility, but it does present a confusing picture.

Member states that are part of NATO, which is the vast majority of the EU, will be coordinating their responses to drones through EU mechanisms and NATO mechanisms at the same time. This is acknowledged in the plan when it refers to „strong EU-NATO cooperation” but is not adequately addressed for the challenges it presents. Commands will be operating in different chains. Information will be passing in different channels. Capabilities developed with EU funding could very well be integrated into NATO command structures, where interoperability policies will reflect American interests more than European ones.

This is not criticism of the plan; it reflects the structural reality of how European security organizations actually operate. But it means that the EU’s counter-drone framework, however well-designed, will remain one layer in a more complex security architecture rather than a comprehensive European solution.

Conclusion: Necessary but Incomplete

The Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security represents significant progress in how the European Union approaches an urgent security challenge. It demonstrates that Brussels can move beyond abstract statements toward concrete deliverables with specified timelines and resource commitments. The four-pillar framework is logically coherent, and individual components are well-considered.

Yet the plan succeeds at what the EU does best: identifying the problem and providing a framework in which solutions might be found, while it remains uncertain about what the EU does worst: implementing solutions rapidly and decisively to overcome parochialism in the member states and achieve integrated capabilities with operational effectiveness.

The test of time will tell whether the Action Plan is indeed a catalyst for change or whether it will prove to be just another case of what the EU does best: planning and implementing something on a massive scale, but in practice, its implementation will bear all the hallmarks of what can arguably be described as a mosaic of national interests and priorities, loosely coordinated by Brussels. The end result will likely be a compromise between the two extremes: some ambitious plans progressing further than anticipated and some quietly being shelved in the details of the implementation phase. The end result will almost certainly be a patchwork of a European counter-drone capability that is better than what currently exists in its fragmented form but still far from the integrated EU-wide capability envisioned by the Commission.

The larger context matters. This plan arrives at a moment when Russian hybrid threats against EU territory have moved from abstract warning to concrete reality. Polish airspace has experienced unauthorized incursions. Energy infrastructure across the Eastern flank faces persistent drone attacks. The perception that Europe can respond effectively to these threats will partially determine whether they continue or escalate. In that sense, announcing an ambitious action plan, even one facing implementation challenges, carries strategic value in itself.

The real test comes now: in Q2 2026, when the first deliverables are due; in Q3 2026, with the proposed Drone Security Package; and increasingly through 2027, as the plan transitions from paper to deployed capabilities. By that standard, the action plan represents the necessary first step. Whether it becomes sufficient depends on execution that remains to be demonstrated.