Poland joins all five major EU defence projects. Eastern Flank Watch could reach €100 billion

The largest programme is Eastern Flank Watch, with planned investment of €60–100 billion by 2036. It is much more than a border surveillance initiative. The project covers ground combat, drone defence, C4ISTAR, counter-mobility, military mobility, and air and missile defence. It also provides for joint procurement of equipment, services and infrastructure, as well as the expansion of European production capacity. Poland is part of the project. France is not.

This is important politically because France is participating in the other four projects, but not in the one focused directly on the eastern flank. Poland, by contrast, is involved in the entire portfolio. Warsaw is therefore not limiting itself to the defence of the border with Russia. It is also entering European projects focused on air defence, space, unmanned systems, maritime security and critical underwater infrastructure.

The second major programme is the EU Federated Integrated Air and Missile Defence including Early Warning, with estimated investment of €55–80 billion by 2040. The objective is not to build a single “European Patriot”, but to connect national sensors, effectors and command systems into one interoperable architecture. For Poland, the key question will be how systems such as Wisła, Narew and Pilica+ are integrated with this wider European structure and with NATO air and missile defence.

The SPACE project could reach €24 billion by 2034. It includes satellite early warning, SATCOM, ISR, SIGINT, space domain awareness, PNT, NAVWAR and the ability to rapidly launch replacement satellites. Integrated Maritime and Seabed Defence is estimated at €43–72 billion by 2045 and will cover ports, offshore infrastructure, pipelines, undersea cables and wider maritime and seabed capabilities. Poland participates in both.

DECODER is financially smaller, at €3.5–5 billion by 2033, but it has the broadest participation. It is not limited to buying drones and counter-drone systems. The project is also intended to develop technology, test new solutions, accelerate modernisation and increase European production capacity. This is one of the clearest examples of lessons from the war in Ukraine being transferred into European defence-industrial policy.

Four other proposals did not enter the first group: robotic land combat units, artillery systems, multidomain platforms and a European defence data space for AI. They may return in future rounds. This shows that the EU is not building one programme, but a wider portfolio of defence projects that could gradually expand into additional areas.

For Poland, the key point is quite clear and Warsaw is present in all five first-generation projects. If they move from political declarations to procurement, production and infrastructure, Poland will participate not only in defending the eastern flank, but also in shaping European air, space, maritime and unmanned capabilities. That gives Poland a role much broader than simply being a frontline state, waiting for more punches from Russia.