The Fall of Syria: A Painful Blow to Iran

“Syria is Iran’s 35th province, a strategic province for us. If we were attacked and forced to choose between Syria and Khuzestan, our priority would be to hold Syria. If we keep Syria, we can retake Khuzestan, but if we lose Syria, we won’t be able to keep Tehran.” This statement was made in 2013 by Hojjat al-Islam Mehdi Taeb, an Iranian analyst and head of the pro-government Ammar think tank. At the time, Iran was building its influence in the region, with saving Assad from collapse as its primary goal.

Long Term Partnership

To understand the consequences for Iran of the collapse of the Syrian Arab Republic, it is essential to note that this was not a tactical alliance, of which there are many in the Middle East, but a long-term and enduring partnership. At the same time, it was an unusual alliance, as it brought together a religious state (Iran) and a secular state (Syria). The two nations were united by political isolation in the Middle East following Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel in the late 1970s, which Damascus rejected. At the same time, Iran was just beginning its anti-Israeli trajectory.

The roots of this alliance can be traced back to the 1980s, when Syria supported Iran during its war with Iraq. Notably, while Tehran applied aggressive rhetoric to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and its Ba’ath Party, calling them “godless” and “a cancer to be removed”, Iran was more measured in its dealings with Syria, despite it being led by the same political faction (the Ba’ath Party). Officially, Iran, with its unwavering religious principles, refrained from criticizing Syria for its secular nature or for persecuting Muslims.

From Iran’s perspective, Syria’s influence in Lebanon was significant from the outset (Syrian forces only left Lebanon in 2005). Tehran, meanwhile, sought to establish a bridge between its territory and Israel to exert influence. Damascus, in turn, gained support in its fight against Israel to reclaim the Golan Heights. The alliance with Assad came at a low cost for Iran, but the benefits were substantial. Without Damascus’s support, Iran would not have been able to help establish Hezbollah in the 1980s, certainly not at the scale and form it achieved.

The Iranian-Syrian alliance grew stronger after 2000, under Bashar al-Assad’s rule, bolstered by a series of events, including the increased U.S. presence in the region (following the 2003 Iraq invasion) and the Cedar Revolution in 2005, which led to Syrian forces« withdrawal from Lebanon. Other contributing factors included the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

By 2008, Iran had financially assisted Syria in purchasing 33 used MiG-23 aircraft. After protests erupted in Syria, Iran likely supplied equipment to monitor internet activity and communications to track key protest organizers. It also deployed non-military advisors and intelligence officers to help quell unrest without direct military intervention. However, contrary to Iranian experts« recommendations, Assad deployed military forces to Syrian streets, escalating tensions.

To save Assad, Iran deployed units best suited to irregular warfare in Syria, including its special forces, unconventional units like the Basij and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran also adopted the British “indirect rule” approach, utilizing non-Iranian local soldiers. These included the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the Zainabiyoun Brigade, and Shia fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, and even China.

The first credible evidence of Iranian soldiers in Syria appeared on May 27, 2012, when IRNA published (and later deleted) an article quoting Brigadier General Ismail Ghaani, deputy commander of the Quds Force, saying, “Without the Islamic Republic’s presence in Syria, the massacres would have been on a larger scale.”

Over time, Iran increased its ground involvement in Syria. Following the commencement of Russian airstrikes, it led a strategically significant but costly offensive in Aleppo, which IRGC commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari described as the “frontline of the Islamic revolution” and a “great defeat for our enemies, led by America and Israel.” In March 2013, General Qasem Soleimani envisioned creating a multinational Shia and Alawite force numbering 150,000 soldiers - unbelievable now.

Syria in a Geostrategic Dimension

According to Tehran’s official narrative, its actions in Syria were limited to protecting holy sites and fighting a Manichean battle: forces of good (Iran and its allies) against evil (jihadists, the United States, and Israel). Tehran framed its involvement as strictly defensive.

In practice, Syria’s strategic importance to Iran is undeniable. Alongside Lebanon and Iraq, Syria provides Iran with strategic depth. Syrian-Iranian geostrategic and defensive connections were explained by General Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces. He reiterated that Syria was a battleground for confronting the “Western-Arab-Zionist front.”

In January 2017, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with families of soldiers who died in Syria. He stated, “If these criminals and insurgents, America’s and Zionism’s puppets, had not been stopped in Syria, we would now be fighting them in Tehran, Fars, Khorasan, and Isfahan.” Similarly, Quds Force officer General Iraj Masjedi emphasized that every Iranian soldier, regardless of the battlefield, protects the “sacred land of the Islamic Republic.”. This happened on the ocassion of the first anniversary of the Iranian General Abbas Ali Alizade being deceased near Aleppo.

Iran’s presence in Syria is not just about defending its “vital core”, its own territory and the Tehran regime, but also about securing its ability to project power and influence adversaries beyond its borders. Maintaining Bashar al-Assad’s regime was critical to preserving Iranian influence in Syria. Without Assad, Iran risked losing its connection to Hezbollah and Lebanon, cutting itself off from Israel. This would also hinder access to Palestine, complicating collaboration with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as smuggling routes through the Red Sea, Sudan, and Egypt have been blocked in recent years.

In 2012, Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to the Supreme Leader, confirmed this perspective, calling Syria “the golden nexus in the chain of resistance against Israel.” Similarly, Qasem Soleimani referred to Syria as “a bridge on the resistance front (…) Anyone intelligent understands that losing the war in Syria is a loss for all of us.”

Losing Syria would significantly diminish Iran’s ability to influence Israel, which retains its capacity to pressure Iran. This jeopardizes Iran’s ambition to reshape the regional security architecture in the Middle East. Its efforts to strengthen its position as a global Shia leader are now in crisis, while the broader Shia bloc faces growing defensive challenges.

It is worth noting that Syria was considered a potential economic partner, though its war and Iran’s international isolation have stifled these prospects. Syria’s territory holds strategic importance for proposed pipelines transporting Middle Eastern oil and gas to Europe. One such project involves a pipeline linking the Qatar-Iran gas field “South Pars” (“North Dome”), the world’s largest, to Europe via Iraq, Syria, and potentially Lebanon. Iran signed a related cooperation memorandum with Syria in 2011.

What’s next?

A decade ago, Iran envisioned building regional power under its leadership. Now, however, Iranian leaders watch as their Damascus embassy is plundered. This is a stark symbol of international volatility and the fragility of success. While Iran may retain some influence in Syria, returning to its pre-conflict position seems unlikely. Only the costs remain. While exact figures are uncertain, Iran’s engagement in Syria reportedly costs around $15 billion annually.

The Islamic Republic of Iran fears losing its standing in the Muslim world and among the so-called “Arab street”, a reputation it had cultivated under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Until recently, Iran portrayed itself as a competent champion of Muslim causes and a staunch opponent of “global arrogance”. However, both Hamas and Hezbollah (key elements of Iran’s Resistance Axis) have been weakened. Israel may seize this opportunity to increase direct pressure on the Islamic Republic.

While Mehdi Taeb’s argument that losing Syria would automatically lead to Tehran’s collapse (possibly through a strengthened Arab-Sunni bloc) may be overstated, the current situation could bolster Sunni factions at Shia expense. It is worth noting that Iran has a Sunni minority, and jihadists occasionally emerge there. Events in Syria could embolden them, fueling centrifugal forces. While they lack the strength to overthrow the Islamic Republic, they could pose public security challenges. Increased internal repression in Iran is inevitable as the government feels more threatened than ever.