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Where to flee in the event of war? Suwałki Gap is not really NATO’s weakness
Where should Latvian residents evacuate in the event of Russian aggression? How should all the Baltic states respond? A debate has begun in Latvia concerning possible civilian evacuation routes, border security and NATO’s role. Particular attention is being paid to the Suwałki Gap, which has long been presented as one of the Alliance’s most vulnerable points.
First, it must be emphasised that any Russian military operation in the Suwałki Gap would require an enormous military commitment from Moscow. Moreover, Russia currently lacks sufficient capabilities to open another major front while simultaneously continuing its war against Ukraine.
Where should Latvians flee?
In an interview with the Latvian news portal LA.LV, Mārtiņš Ruģēns of the Latvian War Museum indicated that, in the event of a threat coming from the east, Courland, located in western Latvia, could be a relatively safer evacuation destination. Rural areas would be particularly important, as residents have access to alternative sources of water and food.
However, major cities, military bases, ports and important infrastructure facilities should be avoided. At the same time, it must be remembered that Courland is not beyond the range of Russian missiles and drones. Simply being further away from a potential front line does not guarantee safety.
Another alternative for Latvian residents would be evacuation through Estonia to Finland or maritime connections to Sweden. However, their use would depend on the military situation, the security of ports and the availability of transport.
Another scenario under consideration involves evacuation through Lithuania and Poland towards Western Europe. This raises the issue of the Suwałki Gap, which provides the land connection between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO. In the event of a conflict, the same area would be important for the movement of Allied forces, deliveries of weapons and the evacuation of civilians.
The problem is the limited capacity of road and railway infrastructure. Large-scale and uncontrolled civilian movements would complicate military operations, making close coordination between civilian and military activities essential. We are talking about an undertaking on an enormous scale, which has not yet been exercised under such conditions.
The Suwałki Gap. NATO's weakness or a trap for Russia?
For years, the Suwałki Gap has been presented as a potential, and even primary, target of a Russian offensive. However, I believe such scenarios are often overestimated – to Moscow’s advantage – and exaggerated. The concentration of substantial Russian forces in Belarus would be difficult to conceal from NATO’s intelligence and reconnaissance systems.
Furthermore, Russian armoured columns attempting to operate in this relatively narrow area would be exposed to strikes from aircraft, artillery, drones and precision-guided weapons. Capturing the Gap itself would be extremely demanding, while holding it under pressure from Allied forces could prove even more difficult. Russia would also have to resolve logistical problems, as deliveries of fuel, ammunition and food would be exposed to constant attacks and disruptions.
Kaliningrad: Russia's own weakness
The importance of the Kaliningrad Oblast cannot be overlooked, as in such a scenario it would become one of the most vulnerable areas of Russia’s military system – in other words, it would be destroyed within the first hours of the conflict. Russia maintains troops, missile systems and air defences there, but the region remains isolated from the Russian Federation.
In the event of a direct conflict with NATO, Russian military infrastructure, airfields, ports and supply routes would be exposed to Allied attacks. Kaliningrad is not only a threat to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, but also remains a weakness for Russia itself. Furthermore, Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO has significantly changed the situation in the Baltic Sea, where the Alliance has gained considerably greater capabilities for military operations. After all, we now refer to it as the “NATO Sea”.
An attack on the Suwałki Gap would hardly be some brilliant gambit by Moscow, as it would significantly restrict its freedom of manoeuvre, tie down Russian forces and expose the military infrastructure of the Kaliningrad Oblast to destruction. From the perspective of Poland and the Baltic states, the more immediate threat in the short term remains Russian hybrid activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, arson and attacks on critical and transport infrastructure.
The very prospect of “fleeing” the Baltic states in the event of war opens up another debate. It forces a discussion not only in Latvia, but also in the other Baltic states and probably Poland: what should be done if a conflict breaks out and some residents want to flee? The Latvian debate already includes specific regions and possible evacuation scenarios. The question is whether other countries on NATO’s eastern flank will also engage in a similar discussion.




