GRU chief and General Staff planners: Who is Putin sending to negotiate an end to the war?

The five publicly identified members of the Russian delegation for talks with Ukraine and the United States scheduled for 10–11 November 2026 represent three centres of power: the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff. According to Interfax, their participation was confirmed by Dmitry Peskov following Vladimir Putin’s meeting with members of the Security Council. Medinsky has once again been appointed to lead the delegation. Yuri Ushakov is overseeing preparations in his capacity as presidential aide for international affairs. Interfax lists him separately from the five named participants. The published list does not establish the total size of the delegation or its supporting team of experts.

Medinsky: Political authority and continuity of demands

Vladimir Medinsky (Владимир Мединский), according to a biography published by Vedomosti, served as Minister of Culture from 2012 to 2020 before becoming an aide to Putin. He chairs the Russian Military Historical Society and has long been involved in shaping state policy on historical memory. He led the Russian delegation in talks with Ukraine in 2022, again in Istanbul in 2025 and in Geneva in February 2026.

Medinsky also maintains close relations with Sergei Naryshkin, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), which the independent outlet Important Stories describes as close ties. Official SVR materials document cooperation between the intelligence service and the society headed by Medinsky, including the construction of a monument to Yuri Andropov at the Foreign Intelligence Academy. Medinsky has also received the SVR medal marking „100 Years of INO–PGU–SVR”.

In its 2026 report, Estonian intelligence highlighted their joint involvement in establishing the Leo Tolstoy International Peace Prize, which it assessed as a Russian influence initiative. Medinsky therefore operates within the circles surrounding the SVR leadership and cooperates with the service on projects serving the Kremlin’s foreign policy objectives. Public sources do not confirm that he has formally served in intelligence.

Within the delegation, his position is primarily determined by Putin’s mandate and his experience in presenting Russian demands. The remaining participants provide diplomatic, intelligence and military expertise. This composition combines the political leadership of a presidential representative with the capabilities required to discuss the details of a potential agreement. The internal division of responsibilities has not been disclosed.

Medinsky’s previous conduct during negotiations helps explain scepticism about his renewed leadership. In May 2025, Reuters, citing two sources familiar with the meeting, reported that he had declared Russia’s readiness to continue the war for as long as necessary. He referred to Peter the Great’s 21-year war against Sweden. According to Reuters, the historical analogy was intended to exert pressure by conveying that Moscow was prepared for a prolonged conflict.

As reported by Deutsche Welle, Hanna Shelest of the Ukrainian Prism think tank assessed that retaining Medinsky as head of the delegation could serve to demonstrate to the Americans a willingness to negotiate without agreeing to a settlement on fundamental issues. Speaking before the list of participants was announced, she noted that including representatives of the intelligence services could increase the prospects for more substantive negotiations.

Ryabkov: Negotiator specialising in the United States and European security

The most significant change in the Russian delegation is the inclusion of Sergei Ryabkov (Сергей Рябков), a diplomat specialising in relations with the United States and European security. According to his biography published by the PIR Center, he graduated from MGIMO and entered the diplomatic service in 1982. He headed the OSCE department, held senior positions at the Russian embassy in Washington and subsequently led the Foreign Ministry’s Department of European Cooperation. He has served as Deputy Foreign Minister since August 2008.

His position should also be considered in the context of the influence exercised by the intelligence services over Russian diplomacy. Donald N. Jensen and Julia Osmolovska, in the Atlantic Council report „Adversary at the Table: Negotiating with Putin’s Russia”, published in February 2026, refer to an assessment by former US Ambassador to Moscow John Sullivan, according to whom Ryabkov had to answer to the FSB and SVR „informally but fully”. This indicates the dependence of his diplomatic activities on Russia’s security apparatus rather than confirming any formal service in intelligence.

Ryabkov also participated in an initiative supported by Pravfond, a foundation linked to Russian intelligence services and influence operations. As reported by Literaturnaya Gazeta, on 20 February 2025 he appeared alongside its director, Alexander Udaltsov, at the presentation of an issue of the magazine Russkaya Mysl devoted to the Yalta Conference. The publication was financed by Pravfond. This documents contact with the institutional structures supporting Russian influence abroad, although there is no evidence that Ryabkov held a leadership position within the foundation.

The significance of his participation in the Abu Dhabi talks stems primarily from his previous role in negotiations concerning European security. As Agentstvo recalls, Ryabkov presented Russia’s demands in December 2021, subsequently coordinated talks with the United States and headed the Russian delegation in Geneva in January 2022. At that time, Moscow demanded an end to NATO enlargement, restrictions on weapons deployments and the withdrawal of the Alliance’s military presence to its 1997 levels, before the accession of Central and Eastern European countries.

Ryabkov’s inclusion therefore indicates that Moscow is preparing for discussions extending beyond the battlefield situation to encompass relations with Washington, arms control and the principles governing military deployments in Europe. This interpretation is reinforced by Lavrov’s statement on 9 November 2026, in which he justified Ryabkov’s participation by referring to his experience in North Atlantic affairs, arms control and the OSCE.

Commentators differ in their assessments of the consequences of this appointment. According to Deutsche Welle, Vladimir Frolov considers the Russian team a serious delegation but suggests that Moscow may be interested in a legally binding agreement with the United States and NATO resembling its proposals from 2021. Ivan Frolov also recognises the broader agenda but doubts that Russia would accept a ceasefire before reaching a more comprehensive political settlement.

Ryabkov’s presence therefore strengthens the Kremlin’s ability to negotiate European security arrangements, but does not in itself indicate any softening of Russian demands.

Galuzin: Policy towards Ukraine and the post-Soviet region

The second Deputy Foreign Minister in the delegation is Mikhail Galuzin (Михаил Галузин), whose experience includes Asian diplomacy, policy towards the post-Soviet region and leadership of an organisation linked to Russian intelligence services. According to his biography published by RBC, he served as ambassador to Indonesia from 2012 to 2018 and subsequently to Japan from 2018 to 2022. He speaks Japanese and English. He assumed the position of Deputy Foreign Minister on 25 November 2022.

According to TASS, he is responsible for affairs concerning the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Union State of Russia and Belarus. He participated in negotiations with Ukraine in Istanbul in 2025 and Geneva in February 2026. His presence therefore provides continuity in the Foreign Ministry’s representation and experience from previous rounds of negotiations.

An important aspect of his activities is his position as chairman of the Governing Board of Pravfond, the Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad. A Russian statement concerning the meeting approving the foundation’s 2023 annual report and its priorities for 2024 explicitly identifies Galuzin as the chairman of this body. His involvement in managing the foundation was also described in a Le Monde investigation published on 2 June 2024, based on internal documents obtained by Danish public broadcaster DR.

Officially, Pravfond provides legal assistance to Russian compatriots living abroad. However, an investigation by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and its European partners revealed that the foundation had financed the legal defence of individuals accused or convicted of espionage, propaganda projects and influence networks.

Representatives of Estonia’s Internal Security Service (KAPO) and Latvia’s State Security Service (VDD) identified links between the foundation and Russian intelligence services, including the presence of intelligence officers among individuals presented as its experts and employees.

Galuzin is therefore institutionally associated with an organisation that combines policy towards the Russian diaspora with intelligence activities and influence operations. This does not, however, constitute confirmation that he has personally served in intelligence.

Regarding Ukraine, Galuzin has consistently presented the Kremlin’s conditions. In June 2025, according to Interfax, he opposed NATO enlargement to include post-Soviet states and identified Ukraine’s neutral, non-aligned and non-nuclear status as elements of Moscow’s expected settlement.

The combination of Galuzin and Ryabkov reflects the integration of two areas of Russian diplomacy: policy towards the post-Soviet region and negotiations with the United States.

Galuzin brings experience from talks with Kyiv and involvement in organisations seeking to influence the Russian diaspora, while Ryabkov contributes expertise in relations with Washington and arms control. This combination enables simultaneous discussions on conditions concerning Ukraine and Russia’s broader relations with the West. The precise division of responsibilities between the two diplomats has not been disclosed.

Kostyukov: Military intelligence at the negotiating table

Admiral Igor Kostyukov (Игорь Костюков) heads the Main Directorate of the General Staff, Russia’s military intelligence service still commonly referred to as the GRU, and serves as Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

According to RBC, he has a naval education, graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy and served as military attaché in Greece. He participated in directing Russia’s military operation in Syria. He has headed military intelligence since late 2018, following the death of Igor Korobov.

His participation means that the leadership of the intelligence service responsible for providing Russian authorities with information about the adversary, its forces and intentions will be represented at the talks. His presence can therefore be interpreted as an opportunity to combine assessments of negotiating proposals with Russian intelligence evaluations of the military situation. However, the specific scope of his responsibilities during the November round has not been publicly disclosed.

Kostyukov already has experience with this negotiating format. As The Insider recalls, he led the Russian delegation during the first two rounds of talks in Abu Dhabi in January and February 2026. His participation therefore represents continuity in an existing military-intelligence channel.

Zhigarlovsky: Military planning and the feasibility of agreements

Lieutenant General Yuri Zhigarlovsky (Юрий Жигарловский) is the least publicly known member of the team. He represents the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, where he serves as deputy chief. This is a separate organisation from the military intelligence service headed by Kostyukov.

According to the alumni website of the Minsk Suvorov Military School, Zhigarlovsky graduated from the institution in 1983, followed by the Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command School in 1987, the Combined Arms Academy in 2001 and the Military Academy of the General Staff in 2007.

The website also reports his promotion to lieutenant general in June 2021. However, this biography comes from an alumni organisation rather than a comprehensive official service record.

Of particular importance is information about his earlier involvement in negotiations. On 26 January 2026, Agentstvo identified him in photographs of the Russian delegation attending talks in Abu Dhabi. The November announcement officially lists Zhigarlovsky among the participants, although journalists had already established his presence during the January round through photographic evidence.

Zhigarlovsky’s significance stems from his position within the structure responsible for military planning. Such experience may be necessary to assess the feasibility of agreements concerning armed forces activities and their military consequences.

His presence complements the expertise of the military component of the delegation: alongside the intelligence chief sits a representative responsible for military planning.

What the delegation's composition may reveal about the Kremlin's intentions

Bloomberg, as summarised by Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, interprets the strengthening of the delegation as a possible indication of readiness for more substantive discussions covering both political issues and the military situation.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in its assessment of 7 November 2026, reaches a more critical conclusion. It argues that the Kremlin is once again sending officials who previously prolonged negotiations and maintained maximalist demands.

According to the institute, Ryabkov’s participation may serve to shift discussions away from security guarantees for Ukraine towards Russian expectations of the United States and NATO. This is an assessment of Moscow’s intentions rather than a disclosed set of instructions for its negotiators.

An examination of the participants’ expertise indicates that Russia is preparing for detailed negotiations over political and military conditions. Medinsky provides presidential authority, Ryabkov brings experience in negotiations with the United States, Galuzin contributes knowledge of policy towards the post-Soviet region, Kostyukov provides the military intelligence perspective, and Zhigarlovsky brings expertise in military planning.

The composition of the Russian delegation makes it possible to conduct detailed political and military negotiations. However, the scope of any potential concessions depends on Putin’s instructions.

Strengthening the team with experienced diplomats and military officers does not in itself demonstrate a change in the Kremlin’s position or a willingness to compromise.